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Comments
IMPLYING A DAMAGE REMEDY AGAINST MUNICIPAL-
ITIES DIRECTLY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
AS AN OBSTACLE TO EXTENSION OF
THE BIVENS DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
When persons acting under color of state law deprive another of
any federally secured right, a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 affords
the victim the right to obtain equitable or compensatory relief. This
remedy has been restricted, however, by Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting the statutory term "person" to preclude municipal liability under
the statute.2 The exclusion of municipal defendants from section 1983's
remedial scheme limits the protection afforded federal rights. While the
Court has upheld the granting of equitable relief against municipalities
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizens of the United States or other person within the jurisriction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961) (city not a person under
§ 1983 where damages are sought); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507,
512-13 (1973) (city not a person under § 1983 for purposes of equitable relief).
See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
The lower courts have split on the question whether the Monroe preclusion
extends to other local governmental entities such as school boards. Compare Adkins
v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975) and Patterson v. Ramsey,
Civil No. Y-75-964, at 7. (D. Md., March 29, 1976) (school board not a person
under § 1983), with Aurora Educ. Ass'n 'East v. Board of Educ., 490 F.2d 431,
435 (7th Cir. 1973) (school board a person under § 1983). See also Gray v. Union
County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975). The
Supreme Court has reserved the question whether a school board is a person under
section 1983, Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,
612 n.11 (1974), but has agreed to decide the question during the 1976 term. Doyle
v. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd., 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted
96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976). See generally McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA.
L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1974).
(123)
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
in general federal question actions based directly on the fourteenth amend-
ment,3 the availability of damages remains uncertain. 4
Several approaches have been suggested for circumventing the ex-
clusion of municipalities from Section 1983 to provide a damage remedy
against them for constitutional violations. Recently, commentators have
argued that the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics may allow recovery of damages from
a municipality on a claim founded on the fourteenth amendment.7 In
3. See cases cited note 48 infra.
4. The eleventh amendment precludes the federal courts from assuming juris-
diction over actions against a state. The amendment provides:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
Although the amendment is couched in terms prohibiting actions instituted by citi-
zens of other states, it has been interpreted to reach suits by citizens of the same
state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Thus neither injunctive nor compensa-
tory relief against a state is available in the federal courts for constitutional viola-
tions by state officials. The amendment does not, however, prevent federal courts
from providing effective relief against the offending official. Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908).
The Court has consistently held that the eleventh amendment does not bar
an action in the federal courts against a municipality. Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S.
651, 667 n.12 (1974). But see Washington v. Brantley, 352 F. Supp. 559 (M.D.
Fla. 1972). Municipalities are not entitled to the protection of the eleventh amend-
ment because decrees or judgments entered against them do not bind the State and
are not satisfied out of state funds. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
930-37 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. While there is no
jurisdictional bar to suits against a municipality, the presence of such a bar to suits
against a state might lead one to question the importance of municipal liability in
remedying constitutional violations by municipal employees.
5. See Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kates & Kouba]
(suggesting the utilization of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to incorporate state law where
municipal immunity has been abrogated). But see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S. 693, 710 (1973) (§ 1988 cannot be used to circumvent what Congress refused
to do in § 1983).
See Comment, Toward State and Municipal Liability in Damages for Denial
of Racial Equal Protection, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1142, 1164-69 (1969). [Hereinafter
cited as Comment, Equal Protection] (restriction of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape
inapplicable to the extent of state abrogation of immunity) ; Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Congress did not intend to create municipal
immunity, only to defer to existing local law), rev'd on other ground sub nor.,
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 419 (1973). See Comment, Developing
Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1203-07
(1971) (legislative history utilized in Monroe v. Pape should be reexamined).
6. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
7. See Note, Municipal Liability in Damages for Violations of Constitutional
Rights - Fashioning A Cause of Action Directly from the Constitution - Brault
v. Town of Milton, 7 CONN. L. REV. 552 (1975); Note, Damage Remedies Against
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Bivens the Supreme Court recognized a federal cause of action for dam-
ages against federal agents based directly on the fourth amendment.
The lower federal courts have split on the availability of the damage
remedy; some have readily accepted the extension of Bivens to four-
teenth amendment claims,8 while others have rejected the remedy be-
cause of concern for federalism 9 or the exclusion of municipalities from
section 1983.10 Some courts have expressly declined to decide the ques-
tion."
Recovery directly from municipalities instead of from individual
municipal officers would be advantageous for several reasons. First, suing
the municipality eliminates the need to identify the particular individual
responsible for the deprivation, a task which may be extremely difficult,
for example in the event of group action. 12 Second, municipalities have
greater financial resources than individual employees who may often
Municipalities for Consitutional Violations, 89 HARv. L. .Rv. 922 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Damage Remedies]; Hundt, Suing Municipalities Directly
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 770 (1975).
8. Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732-35 (2d Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, id. at 736 (1975) (en banc) (taking of property without due process);
Hastrop v. Board of Junior Colleges, 523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975) (em-
ployee dismissal), petition for cert. filed, 96 S. Ct. 1748 (1976) ; Hanna v. Drobnick,
514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975) (fourth amendment violation by building inspector)
Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (police misconduct);
Barszcz v. Board of Trustees of Community College, 400 F. Supp. 675, 676 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (dismissal of public employee) ; Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (illegal arrest and detention); Patterson v. City of Chester, 389
F. Supp. 1093, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dismissal of public employee); Waltenberg
v. New York City Dep't of Correction, 376 F. Supp. 41, 43-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment) ; Stephens v. City of
Plano, 375 F. Supp. 985, 986 (E.D. Texas 1974) (taking of property without due
process) ; Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (zoning
ordinance amounts to an unconstitutional taking) ; Cox v..Stanton, No. 74-2218 (4th
Cir., Oct. 6. 1975); see Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429,
432-33 (4th Cir. 1974) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
9. See Clipper v. City of Takoma Park, Civil No. 737295-B (D. Md., March
25, 1975) ; Jamison v. McCurrie, 388 F. Supp. 990, 992 (N.D. I1. 1975) ; Perzanow-
ski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 230 (D. Conn. 1974).
10. See Clipper v. City of Takoma Park, Civil No. 73-295-B (D. Md., March
25, 1975); Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 323, 326 (.N.D. Ohio 1974); Smetanka v.
Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366, 1377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ; Payne v.
Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Brault v. Town of
Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 735-36 (2d Cir.) (Timbers, J., dissenting), vacated on other
grounds, id. at 736 (1975) (en bane).
11. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, at 76 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1975)
Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1975) (en bane) ; Aldinger v.
Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1259 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976) ; Apton
v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ; Patterson v. Ramsey, Civil No. Y-75-964,
at 11 (D. Md., March 29, 1976).
12. See Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1265, 1271, 1281-82, 1284, 1286 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (burden on plaintiffs to establish which
of the sixty-nine defendant policemen had fired the harmful shots) ; Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 282-84 (3d Cir. 1972) (directed verdict upheld where plaintiff
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be judgment proof.1 Third, a municipality is less likely to evoke jury
sympathy than an individual employee sued for actions taken in at-
tempting to perform his duty.14 Fourth, the availability of defenses and
immunities to municipalities is problematical, 15 while individual defend-
ants in section 1983. damage actions enjoy a well established defense
of good faith' 6 and even absolute immunity in some circumstances. 7
Finally, municipal liability may result 'in increased deterrence of consti-
tutional violations on the theory that direct governmental liability will
spur internal regulation to eradicate the sources of unconstitutional
behavior.' 8
While municipal liability may be desirable, the application of Bivens
to the fourteenth amendment context raises serious questions regarding
the proper role of the federal judiciary in implementing the Constitution.
For the judiciary to imply a cause of action for damages for a violation
of a right secured by the Constitution, there must be jurisdiction,'9 a
cause of action, judicial power to award damages, and a determination that
failed to establish that the defendants were the two policemen who actually ad-
ministered the beating).
13. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966); Kates &
Kouba, supra note 5, at 136-37; Comment, Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 1158.
14. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; Note, Damage Remedies,
supra note 7, at 923.
15. See Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 952-58.
16. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974) (executive officer enjoys
qualified immunity if action was taken in good faith and was reasonable in light
of all circumstances) ; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (police officers
enjoy defense of good faith and reasonable belief). This defense has also been
extended to federal officers sued directly under the Constitution. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48
(2d Cir. 1972) (on remand).
17. See. e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984, 993-95 (1976) (prosecutors)
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341: U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators).
18. See Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Note,
Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 927; K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREvATISE
§ 25.17 (Supp. 1965) ; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 495-96 (1955).
19. The jurisdictional issue poses little difficulty. In actions brought pursuant
to section 1983 based on the deprivation of constitutional rights, jurisdiction is
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which does not have any minimum amount in
controversy requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person . . .
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States.
The language of section 1343(3) seemingly applies to any action "authorized by
law," which should include Bivens-type actions. See Paul v. Dade County, 419
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damages are an appropriate form of relief. Consideration of the propriety
of damages also entails a more general examination of the relationship
between specific remedies and the Constitution. The standards that are
to guide the federal courts in assessing a proposed remedy must be
clearly articulated so that the importance of considerations such as
federalism and conflicting congressional determinations can be properly
evaluated. This Comment first examines the Supreme Court's decision
in Bivens; it discusses the Court's reasoning and the principles that the
decision embodies. Next it considers the applicability of the Bivens
principles to other constitutional provisions including the fourteenth
amendment. The Comment then suggests a method for assessing the
propriety of implying remedies under the Constitution and applies it to
the question of municipal liability under the fourteenth amendment. It
argues that the exclusion of municipalities from the coverage of section
1983 constitutes a congressional determination that on balance makes
judicial recognition of an independent damage remedy ill advised.
II. A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE Bivens CASE
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics20 the Supreme Court held that the victim of an unconstitu-
F.2d 10, 11-13 (5th Cir. 1969) Booth v. Prince George's County, 66 F.R.D. 466,
469 n.2 (D. Md. 1975) ; Bodersteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against
"Non-Persons" for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REV. 215, 223
(1974).
'The decision in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), however,
raises questions about the validity of such an expansive view of section 1343. In
that case the Court ruled that section 1983 did not authorize the provision of
equitable relief against a municipality. A section 1983 claim being absent, jurisdiction
based on section 1343 was not applicable. The Court remanded the case for a
determination of whether section 1331 jurisdiction would be available if the claim was
construed to rely directly on the Constitution. The Court apparently assumed that
section 1343 jurisdiction would not support a Bivens-type claim. See The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 253-56 & n.15 (1973).
If Bruno indeed reflects such a limitation of section 1343 jurisdiction, it
indicates that an action based directly on the Constitution must be brought pursuant
to the general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There is no
dispute that a Bivens-type action "arises under" the Constitution as required by
section 1331. In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Court held that a federal
court had federal question jurisdiction to decide whether a claim based on the
fourth amendment was actionable. To satisfy the jurisdictional requirement, the
complaint need only disclose on its face a non-frivolous constitutional claim. See
C.A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT]. Thus, the only jurisdictional question remaining in actions based
directly on the Constitution is whether the claim satisfies the $10,000 amount in
controversy figure. See generally Comment, The Jurisdictional Amount in Contro-
versy in Suits to Enforce Federal Rights, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 545 (1976).
20. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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tional search by federal law enforcement officers could recover damages
from the officers .on a federal claim based directly on the fourth amend-
ment despite the absence of a specific statutorily created cause of action.
The federal agents had ransacked Bivens' apartment during a warrantless
search, arrested him in front of his family, subjected him to a humiliating
personal search and then released him without filing charges. The ex-
clusionary rule, which operates in criminal proceedings to exclude evi-
dence unconstitutionally seized, offered no relief to Bivens because no
evidence had been uncovered. Injunctive relief also would have been
unavailing since there was no indication that the search was part of a
planned pattern of illegal police activity. 2' Thus the only effective remedy
for the injury sustained by Bivens was money damages. Recognition in
Bivens of a damage claim against federal officers was therefore necessary
to avoid an inequitable deficiency in the remedial structure of the Con-
stitution.22
Justice Brennan began his opinion for the Court by considering
whether a federal cause of action may be based on the fourth amendment.
The defendants had argued that the right to privacy that Bivens sought
to vindicate was a creation of state and not of federal law.23 Thus, Bivens
should have brought a tort suit under state law. When the federal
agents raised the defense that they were exercising federal power, Bivens
could then use the fourth amendment to demonstrate that their actions
exceeded federal power and thus were not legitimized by federal authority.
In rejecting this argument, the Court recognized the independent basis of
fourth amendment claims.
Justice Brennan invoked two lines of authority to support his con-
clusion. First, prior decisions of the Court had firmly established that
the standards of conduct prescribed by the fourth amendment limited
the exercise of federal power in a manner wholly independent of state
21. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
22. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars all suits for damages or injunctions
against the United States except those permitted by statute. See Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). While the Federal
Tort Claims Act constitutes a limited abrogation by the United States of its
immunity with respect to torts committed by federal agents, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80
(1970), at the time Bivens was decided the Act expressly excluded claims arising
out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution or
abuse of process. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970). These exclusions effectively pre-
cluded any attempt to bring fourth amendment claims within the statute. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 725
(2d Cir. 1969). These exceptions have now been in large part eliminated, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (Supp. V, 1975), but even so, there is still no attempt to recognize
claims based specifically on the Constitution. Cf. James v. United States, 358 F.
Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally
K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.03 (3d ed. 1972).
23. 403 U.S. at 390.
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law.2 4 Second, another line of decisions had indicated that federal
standards must prevail if state law regulating trespass and the invasion
of privacy attempted to allow greater intrusions by federal agents than
would be allowable under federal interpretations of the fourth amend-
ment.2 5 The same would be true if states attempted to impose more
restrictive standards on the exercise of federal authority.26 From these
considerations, the Court concluded that:
The inevitable consequence of this dual limitation on state power is
that the federal question becomes not merely a possible defense to
the state law action, but an independent claim both necessary and
sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of action.27
Having decided that the plaintiff stated a federal cause of action,
Justice Brennan turned to a consideration of the power of the federal
courts to grant the requested monetary relief. This point did not pose
significant difficulties for the Court because it felt that the practice of
awarding damages had ample support from the precedents and among
the commentators. 28 "Historically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. '29 The
existence of this judicial power was asserted without explaining either
its nature or source. Although the text of the fourth amendment did not
expressly provide for its enforcement through money damages, this
24. Among the cases cited by the Court were: Gambino v. United States, 275
U.S. 310 (1927) (New York State police officers enforcing National Prohibition
Act acted under color of federal law and were therefore bound by fourth amendment
standards); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (evidence obtained from
search by federal agent pursuant to a valid state warrant held inadmissible in
federal court where search failed to satisfy federal standards) ; Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (standards for electronic surveillance not controlled by
local trespass law).
25. The Court again cited Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), and
also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); In re Ayers 123 U.S. 443, 507
(1887).
26. The Court here cited In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
27. 403 U.S. at 395.
28. Among other authorities, the court cited four voting rights cases: Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Swafford
v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900). Also
cited was Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the
Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, (1968). Katz argues that the
Constitution created interests in liberty cognizable in law in the same manner as
the Magna Carta in England. Just as the Magna Carta became part of the common
law, he asserts that the Constitution transformed a political ethic into a recognized
legal norm. Tracing the growth of remedies in England to protect these interests in
liberty, he argues that the same considerations dictate the creation of adequate
remedial mechanisms to guard constitutional interests.
29. 403 U.S. at 395.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
remedial power, once asserted, allowed the Court to make good the wrong
done.30
The Court's assertion of the power to award the damages left only
the question whether it was appropriate for the Court to exercise the
power. In answering affirmatively, the Court first distinguished cases
where special factors had caused it to refrain from fashioning a remedy
in the absence of congressional guidance.3' Because there were no special
factors present counseling hesitation, the question before the Court was
straightforward.
Finally, we cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question
as whether the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce
the Fourth Amendment. For we have here no explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of
the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the
agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally
effective in the view of Congress. The question is merely whether
petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the
violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is
entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism
normally available in the federal courts.32
The Court, reaching back to Marbury v. Madison3 for the notion that
the existence of a right implied a remedy, concluded that Bivens could
sue for damages on his fourth amendment claim. The criterion for re-
covery was whether Bivens had actually been injured by reason of a
violation of his fourth amendment rights. 3 4
30. 403 U.S. at 396. The Court cited Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684, for this
proposition. The Court in Bell had relied on Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S.
222 (1901), a case brought pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)
(1970), which provides jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for claims against the
United States founded on the Constitution but not sounding in tort. The apparent
implication is that the recognition of claims based directly on the Constitution under
general federal question jurisdiction enables the federal courts to utilize the judicial
power to draft appropriate remedies.
31. The Court cited United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947),
where it had refused to guard indemnification to the United States for medical
expenses incurred in treating a soldier who was struck by a Standard Oil truck
The action was controlled by federal common law, but the Court refused to grant
relief because it felt that federal fiscal affairs were particularly within the legislative
province. Also cited was Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), where the
Court refused to imply a damage remedy against a congressional employee who ex-
ceeded his delegated authority. Because there were no constitutional interests at stake,
regulation of congressional subpoena power was solely a matter of congressional
concern. These two cases both disclose the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with
areas of particular congressional interest. See generally Note, Remedies for Consti-
tutional Torts: "Special Factors Counselling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REv. 441 (1976).
32. 403 U.S. at 397.
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) at 163. It should be noted, however, that the
right at issue in Marbury was statutory, not constitutional.
34. The Court left open the issue of defenses or immunities even though this
was an alternative ground for the decision in the district court. On remand, the
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Thus, while adopting a broad view on the propriety of awarding
damages in the case before it, Justice Brennan's opinion contains quali-
fications that might affect the extension of Bivens to other constitutional
provisions. The rejection of the necessity test was not absolute, but was
accompanied by the cryptic observation that there was no explicit con-
gressional declaration that another remedy, equally effective in its view,
must be employed. The implication is that a more stringent standard
for the judiciary to follow in fashioning remedies might be required where
Congress had designated a different remedial scheme as the exclusive
remedy for a particular constitutional provision. 5 Similar treatment
might be afforded a congressional remedy that was not expressly desig-
nated exclusive. If Congress has grappled with the various competing
considerations that affect the choice of remedy, respect for that body's
superior fact-finding ability might make judicial addition or substitution
of a different remedy inappropriate.3 6 On the other hand, there might be
situations where a particular remedy may be deemed inseparable from
a constitutional provision so that a contrary Congressional determination
would be irrelevant or even unconstitutional.37 The Court's opinion,
however, merely raises these possibilities; it does not discuss the content
of a necessity test nor does it specify the level of congressional activity
which would mandate the higher standard.3 Nevertheless, the inclusion
of these qualifications indicates that a determination of the propriety
of a judicial remedy may encompass more than a concern with the
existence of an injury.
There are two major faults in Justice Brennan's opinion. First, it
inadequately supports the proposition that the fourth amendment may
be a source of federal causes of action.39  Conceding that state law can
Court of Appeals rejected claims of absolute immunity, but ruled that the officers
could raise a defense of good faith and reasonable belief. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1341, 1343, 1346-47
(2d Cir. 1972).
35. One commentator has read this passage to describe the conditions under
which the Court should defer to Congressional judgment about remedial provisions.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As A Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1532, 1548 n.89 (1972). He proposes a two pronged test for deciding whether
the Court should defer to Congress:
(1) Congress has provided an alternative remedy considered by Congress to
be equally effective in enforcing the Constitution, and (2) the Court concludes
that in light of the substitute remedy, the displaced remedy is no longer
"necessary" to effectuate the constitutional guarantee.
Id. at 1549. For a more extensive discussion of the problem of judicial deference
to Congress see notes 120-23 and accompanying text infra.
36. Id. at 1549. See also Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term -
Foreword; Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1975).
37. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1548-49.
38. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text infra.
39. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1534-42; Note, The Truly Constitutional
Tort, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 271, 277-80 (1971).
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neither authorize federal officers to violate the Constitution nor limit the
exercise of federal authority, this perception does not necessarily prove
that a federal cause of action exists. The problem is not solely a matter
of limited state power, but may also depend on other variables such as
the framers' intentions or the common law origins of fourth amendment
rights.40 It is necessary to view the Court's conclusion about the inter-
action of state and constitutional law, however, as a recognition that the
Constitution creates rights and obligations independent of all other sources
of law.4 1 Combining this position with the view expressd in Marbury v.
Madison that the existence of a right necessarily implies a remedy for
its vindication,42 the Court concluded that a remedy could be implied
directly from the fourth amendment. Thus, while the suggestion that the
Constitution has always been viewed as a source of personal rights may
have been unwarranted, the thrust of the reasoning is sound.
The other flaw in Justice Brennan's opinion is that it fails to ex-
plain the source or scope of the judicial power to imply the damage
remedy. The assertion that damages have always been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for violations of interests in liberty may be historically
accurate, but it discloses little about the nature of the power or its
operation. Furthermore, none of the cases cited as precedent for the
provision of damages were based solely on the Constitution, but involved
statutes as well. 43 As a consequence, the Court's attempt to treat its
exercise of the power as a typical instance of a well established practice
is ultimately unconvincing. It can be shown that the power exists,4 4 but
the conclusion seems inescapable that its utilization in this context was
virtually unprecedented. Thus, the primary criticism is not that the
opinion was wrong, but that attempts to minimize the magnitude of the
decision muddled the issues. Given this lack of clarity, Justice Harlan's
remarkably lucid concurring opinion is a valuable tool for understanding
the principles of Bivens.
Like the majority, Justice Harlan began with a consideration of
whether the complaint stated a federal cause of action. He established this
40. It is possible to argue that fourth amendment limitations on the exercise
of federal authority are the result of a demand for uniformity in federal law, with
the basis of the personal rights itself remaining part of the common law. This
common law is necessarily state law by the terms of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). See Note, Constitutional Tort, supra note 39, at 278.
41. See Katz, supra note 28, at 33-34.
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
43. Compare the discussion of these cases in Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1124-25 (1969) with Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1544-45 &
n.70. A review of the cases indicates that Dellinger is correct in treating the claims
as statutory rather than strictly constitutional.
44. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1540-43. Dellinger suggests that the source
of judicial authority is the grant of judicial power in article III. Thus, in claiming
the authority to create a damage remedy for violations of the fourth amendment, the
Court added a new dimension to the meaning of the article III judicial power.
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proposition primarily by reference to federal equity practice.45 In diversity
cases, the federal courts seek to approximate the equity practice of the
state courts on matters of state law. 46 In nondiversity cases, however,
the exercise of federal equitable power depends on the presence of a
substantive right derived from federal law.47 Thus, since the availability
in nondiversity actions of equitable relief based directly on the Constitu-
tion is firmly established,48 it necessarily follows that the Constitution
must create federally protected interests. 49
Justice Harlan then cited the prevailing federal practice under
various regulatory statutes to explain the Court's power to provide for
damages where Congress had not explicitly authorized it to do so. The
Court has frequently implied damage remedies under federal regulatory
statutes silent on the subject. 50 Justice Harlan therefore reasoned that
nothing about conipensatory relief itself precluded the judiciary from
fashioning that remedy. He then observed that it would be anomalous
if the federal courts were empowered to protect interests created by
statute but not those contained in the Constitution. 51 The strength of
this comparison, however, is somewhat diluted by the Court's insistence
45. 403 U.S. at 400.
46. See generally Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104-06 (1945).
47. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 825-32.
48. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232-34 (1964); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See
also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
49. Harlan also expressed affinity for Professor Katz's view, supra note 28,
at 33-44, that the Constitution is itself the source of the rights asserted. 403
U.S. at 400-01 n.3. But see Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 523-24 (1954).
50. A leading example of this sort of judicial initiative is J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where the Court granted damages to a stockholder
claiming violations of the proxy requirements of section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Although the statute provided no damage remedy for this
particular provision, the Court determined that such relief would further the
legislative purposes. See generally, Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. Rlv. 285 (1963).
While Borak was ostensibly based on statutory interpretation, the Court's
language suggested that the judiciary enjoyed broad discretion in selecting remedies.
More recently, however, the Court has demonstrated an inclination to construe
statutes more closely and restrict the implication of damages from regulatory
statutes. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court held that four criteria
had to be satisfied before a private cause of action for damages would be implied:
(1) the plaintiff had to be one of the intended beneficiaries of the statute, (2) there
must be some indication of legislative intent explicit or implicit to create such a
remedy, (3) the proposed remedy must be consistent with the underlying purpose
of the legislative scheme, and (4) the cause of action must not be one that has been
traditionally relegated to state law. This decision does not deny the power asserted
in Borak, but it discloses a preference to limit its exercise.
51. See Katz, supra note 28, at 31-33.
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when implying damage remedies under regulatory statutes that it is
merely determining congressional intent.52
The practice of allowing federal equitable relief against threatened
invasions of constitutional interests presented Justice Harlan with a more
compelling argument for recognizing the judicial power to imply the
damage remedy. Recognition of broad equitable powers enjoyed by the
federal courts dates back to the beginning of the Republic. 53 Equity prac-
tice has developed along liberal lines,5 4 yet there has never been any
explicit congressional action authorizing the use of equitable remedies
to protect constitutional interests. By parity of reasoning, Justice Harlan
concluded that because the general federal question jurisdiction allowed a
federal court to grant equitable relief in any case within that jurisdiction,
the same jurisdictional statute should suffice to permit a federal court to
utilize traditional legal remedies. While there are differences between
the operation of legal and equitable remedies, Justice Harlan's comparison
seems apt. There is but one source - article III - for the judicial
power to fashion both legal and equitable remedies.55 Once Congress
extends jurisdiction over a category of cases, no further authorization
is required to invoke the operation of the judicial power. By focusing
on the federal courts' power to fashion equitable relief under a grant of
article III jurisdiction, Justice Harlan placed consideration of the judicial
power over remedies in proper context. The power to award damages
derives from the judiciary's control over cases within its jurisdiction,
coupled with the fact that damages have historically been an ordinary
remedy. Thus, Justice Harlan clarified the constitutional source of the
Court's authority to administer remedies, a point which the majority
neglected in its discussion of judicial power.
Having determined that the power to grant the damage remedy
exists, Justice Harlan next considered the appropriateness of exercising
this power. In implying remedies under federal statutes, the Court had
52. This is particularly true of the Court's latest foray into this area in Cort v.
Ash, discussed in note 50 supra, which emphasized the statute and its legislative
history. This marks a definite retrenchment from the more liberal view espoused
in Borak.
53. The Process Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93-94, provided that
"the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be according to
the course of the civil law." This was modified by the Second Congress, Act of
May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275-76, to provide that the forms and modes of
proceedings were to be "according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to
courts of equity, . . . as contradistinguished from courts of common law; . . .
subject however to such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively
shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court
of the United States shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to
any circuit or district court concerning the same."
54. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 664-65; WRIGHT, supra note 19,
at § 61.
55. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1541-42; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 104-5 (1945).
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employed a "necessary or appropriate" standard. A remedy would be
implied if necessary or appropriate to effectuate the congressional policies
embodied in the statute. 6 The defendants had argued that when the
Constitution is involved a higher standard - "essentiality" - is required
because it is uncertain whether Congress has the power to modify judicial
choices.5 7 Justice Harlan found this contention unconvincing. A stringent
standard like "essentiality" was unacceptable given the "particular re-
sponsibility"5 8 of the federal courts to vindicate the constitutional interests
embraced in the fourth amendment and in the Bill of Rights generally,
which was designed to protect the individual from legislative majorities.
Instead, the question was whether compensatory relief was "necessary"
or "appropriate." While these words lack precision, 9 Justice Harlan
clearly envisioned a balancing process that would take account of the
various policy considerations germane to a decision on the appropriateness
of a remedy.60 The power of the courts implied a duty to make principled
choices among traditional judicial remedies. 61
56. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-34 (1964).
57. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1546-47. When the courts imply remedies
under federal statutes, congressional modification is easily accomplished by statutory
amendment. Where the Constitution is involved, the question of modification be-
comes murkier. One possible resolution is suggested by Monaghan, supra note 36,
who would classify certain judicial determinations about remedies as constitutional
common law. According to his analysis, judicial policy determinations regarding
implementation of the Constitution should not be considered binding constitutional
determinations, but instead should be used to open a dialogue with Congress in order
to arrive at the proper policy choice. The courts should take the initiative, however,
so that inertia would be on the side of remedies for constitutional rights. Id. at 26-30.
Justice Harlan expressed no view on this question of congressional authority to
overturn judicially fashioned remedies. 403 U.S. at 407 n.7.
58. 403 U.S. at 407. With respect to judicial responsibility for vindicating
constitutional rights, the addition of general federal question jurisdiction in 1875
was the watershed. As a result of this jurisdictional change, the federal courts
"ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states
and became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by
the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States." F. FRANKFURTER &
.. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928).
59. For instance, how does Justice Harlan's use of "necessity" differ from
Justice Brennan's? See notes 91-92 and accompanying text infra.
60. Such balancing of different policy considerations is typical of the Court's
conduct in many areas. Monaghan, supra note 36, has suggested that many of the
Court's decisions that purport to effectuate the Constitution are best explained as
manifestations of constitutional common law. Rather than being authoritative con-
stitutional interpretations, Monaghan assigns such decisions to a sub-strata of
substantive, procedural, and remedial rules that draw their inspiration from the
Constitution but are not required by it. He suggests that such common law decisions
should be clearly identified as such so as to invite congressional participation in
the determination of the appropriate policy for implementation of constitutional
provisions. Id. at 1-26.
61. 403 U.S. at 408 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In assessing the appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory
relief, Justice Harlan noted that the decision did not depend solely on
the deterrent effect of imposing liability, but might instead be based
wholly on the need for compensation. Another significant factor was the
nature of the plaintiff's injury and its susceptibility to normal legal analysis
in terms of causation and measurement of injury; judicial familiarity with
the interests protected by the fourth amendment obviated this concern in
Bivens, but the interests protected by other constitutional provisions might
present difficulties. 62 The desirability of a uniform rule to govern all
federal officers was also a favorable factor. The only substantial policy
consideration discerned by Justice Harlan that counseled against implica-
tion of a damage remedy was the possible strain on judicial resources. 63
Thus, Justice Harlan resolved the problem of appropriateness by balancing
the various factors relating to the provision of the remedy. No single
factor was determinative, but the clear need for compensation and the
absence of significant countervailing considerations mandated the provi-
sion of damages. This result parallels the majority's conclusion that the
need for compensation was compelling. Justice Harlan's approach is more
satisfactory, however, because it recognizes the relevance of factors other
than the existence of an injury, thus rendering itself more responsive to
the possible complexities of extending Bivens to other constitutional
provisions.
III. EXTENSION OF Bivens WITHIN THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AND TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Although the claim in Bivens involved only the fourth amendment,
the Court's reasoning and that of Justice Harlan are equally applicable
to other provisions within the Bill of Rights. Once the notion that the
Constitution creates federally protected interests is accepted, it is easy
to conceive of causes of action arising from a federal officer's interference
with protected first amendment expression 64 or infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. 65 It is also clear that judicial power to fashion
damage remedies extends beyond the fourth amendment. A few courts
have read Bivens to be narrowly confined to the fourth amendment, 66
62. Id. at 409 n.9.
63. 403 U.S. at 410. Although Harlan discounted the possibility of harm,
Justice Black forsaw substantial dangers. 403 U.S. at 428-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
64. E.g., Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973) (federal
officers prevented plaintiffs from protesting the Vietnam war at an air force base),
noted in 62 GEO. L.J. 1771 (1974).
65. Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
66. See Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384 (D. Colo. 1974); Moore v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1974) ; Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp.
922 (E.D. Va. 1972). Two circuits have expressly refused to reach the question
of whether Bivens can be extended; Greenya v. George Washington University, 512
[VOL. 36
1976] THE Bivens DOCTRINE 137
but such an interpretation ignores the reasoning of the majority opinion
as well as Justice Harlan's compelling analysis. 6 7 The more common
view has been to recognize Biven's applicability to other interests within
the Bill of Rights. Thus, damage actions have been recognized for claims
arising under the first,66 fifth,69 sixth,70 and eighth amendments. 71
Curiously, the analysis in these cases has drawn heavily on the
parallel between actions against federal officials under the Bivens doc-
trine and actions against state officials under section 1983.72 In consider-
ing whether a damage remedy would be appropriate in a particular
situation, the courts have emphasized the availability of similar relief
against state officials. 73 For example, in Paton v. LaPrade,74 a case
involving an intrusion on first amendment rights by federal agents, the
Third Circuit reasoned that :75
[b]ecause a Bivens-type cause of action is the federal counterpart
to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we believe that standards for
determining injuries developed in § 1983 litigation are applicable in
this context.
The analogy seems sensible because the Bill of Rights imposes many of
the same constraints on federal agents that the fourteenth amendment,
through incorporation, exerts on state officers. Utilization of Bivens with
respect to other provisions in the Bill of Rights thus ensures that the
victim of unconstitutional conduct has a federal damage remedy available
regardless of whether the perpetrator was a federal or state officer. But
while the parallel with section 1983 supports the legitimacy of extending
Bivens to other constitutional violations by federal officers, it is of little
value when the attempt is to apply Bivens to fourteenth amendment
F.2d 556, 562 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cardinale v. Washington Technical Institute, 500
F.2d 791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96,
103-04 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. For examples of the influence of Justice Harlan's concurrence, see Paton v.
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 870 (3d Cir. 1975) ; Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389,
1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
68. Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Butler v. United States,
365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973). Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398
(N.D. Ill. 1974).
69. United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972)
Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp.
737, 740 (E.D. Ill. 1975); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I.
1973) (dictum), vacated, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973).
70. Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974).
71. Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ill. 1975); James v. United
States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973) (dictum), vacated, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir.
1973).
72. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir. 1975).
73. Id.
74. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 871.
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claims involving state action. If section 1983 delineates the scope of
liability for violations of the fourteenth amendment, it cannot support the
implication of additional remedies against municipalities, which are ex-
cluded from its coverage.
While the Bill of Rights restrains the conduct of the federal govern-
ment, 76 the fourteenth amendment is addressed to the states. Both are
concerned with individual rights, however, and most of the substantive
provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment through the due process clause.77 If the Bill of Rights
is a source of federally protected interests, 78 the same should be true for
the fourteenth amendment. Support for this conclusion can be derived
from cases granting relief against unconstitutional taking of property."
Thus, it seems clear that the fourteenth amendment may be the source
of a federal cause of action.
Judicial power to create a damage remedy under the fourteenth amend-
ment also seems settled after Bivens. Analysis of Bivens discloses that the
source of that power is article 111.80 The only limit on the exercise of
that power imposed by the text of .the Constitution is the requirement
that the court have jurisdiction. The general federal question jurisdic-
tion covers fourteenth amendment claims as well as fourth amendment
ones. In Bivens, the Court had reasoned that because judicial power to
select damage remedies had been established by the experience with regu-
latory statutes"' and equitable remedies had already been provided for
constitutional interests, nothing in either the nature of the remedy or
of the interest to be protected restrained the exercise of the power. This
same analysis applies to the fourteenth amendment; there are numerous
instances in which equitable relief has been provided to protect fourteenth
76. Baron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
77. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment).
78. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
79. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; Mosher v. City of Phoenix,
287 U.S. 29 (1932) ; Chicago B. & 0. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
The case law has paralleled fifth amendment taking cases except jurisdiction is
predicated on § 1331 federal question jurisdiction rather than the Tucker Act.
See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). The cases seem to assume that
the existence of remedies for the taking clause is self-apparent and so both equitable
and compensatory remedies have been provided against municipalities without the
detailed scrutiny undertaken by the Court in Bivens. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland,
493 F.2d 64, 69-70 (6th Cir. 1974); Miller v. County of Los Angeles, 341 F.2d
964, 966 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Foster v. Herly, 330 F2d 87, 90-91 (6th Cir. 1964);
Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (E.D. Mich. 1973). While many
of these cases pre-date Bivens, they are limited authority for the extension of Bivens
to fourteenth amendment claims' generally because the self-executing nature of the
taking clause makes it. su.i generis among constitutional provisions. See Dellinger,
supra note 35, at 1542 & n'58.
80. See note 44 supra.
81. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; note 28 supra.
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amendment interests.8 2 Even those courts that refuse to apply Bivens to
the fourteenth amendment recognize their power to grant the relief, resting
their decisions instead on considerations of appropriateness. 83 The crucial
factor, therefore, is whether a damage remedy against a municipality
founded on the fourteenth amendment is appropriate.
IV. DAMAGE REMEDIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
In the broad array of situations in which deprivations of constitu-
tional rights may occur, the manner in which different remedies will
relate to the constitutional interests involved will vary significantly. A
remedy may be absolutely essential in the sense that a denial of the
remedy causes a constitutional deprivation. For example, refusal to
exclude a confession obtained through official coercion violates a criminal
defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 4 Other
remedies seek to deter future deprivations of constitutional rights. De-
terrence may be accomplished through injunctive relief,8 5 criminal sanc-
tions,86 exclusionary rules that eliminate incentives for engaging in uncon-
stitutional conduct, 7 or damages.88  Injunctions and other equitable
remedies may also serve to institute broad social changes necessary to
secure constitutional rights.8 9 Finally, a remedy may simply attempt to
compensate the victim for injuries suffered through past deprivations of
his constitutional rights. 90 These different levels on which remedies oper-
ate to give content to constitutional rights are significant because they
provide a general perspective for evaluating a court's selection of a remedy
in a particular instance.
Determination of the appropriateness of allowing a remedy obviously
involves a complex decision-making process. Variables include the right
violated, the remedy requested, the availability of other remedies, and
the level of Congressional activity with respect to providing remedies
in the area. This difficult task has been further complicated by a tendency
to mix labels. In Bivens Justice Brennan disclaimed a standard requiring
that a remedy which had not been explicitly rejected by Congress must
82. See Griffin v. Board of Educ., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) ; Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278 (1913); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
Shellburne, Inc. v. New Castle County, 293 F. Supp. 237 (D. Del. 1968).
83. See cases cited in notes 9-10 supra.
84. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
85. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
86. E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
87. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
88. See authorities cited note 18 supra.
89. For example, injunctions have been employed to remedy equal protection
violations in school desegregation cases. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
90. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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still be "necessary" for the enforcement of a constitutional provision for
it to be recognized by the courts.91 Justice Harlan, on the other hand,
phrased the test as whether compensatory relief was "necessary" or
"appropriate," rejecting a more stringent standard of "essentiality. ' 92
Both Justices use the word "necessary," but their intentions vary; Justice
Brennan's "necessary" seems akin to Justice Harlan's "essentiality,"
while Justice Harlan's "necessary or appropriate" seems to denote a
more flexible, less stringent standard. 93
Despite the lack of precision in the labels used, Bivens suggests two
possible standards for assessing the validity of a judicially fashioned dam-
age remedy against municipalities. If section 1983 is treated as an ex-
clusive congressional remedy, the first test would require the plaintiff to
show that a damage remedy against municipalities was essential for
enforcing the fourteenth amendment. If section 1983 is taken as not
controlling, the other approach would follow Justice Harlan's suggestion
and balance the policy considerations favoring recognition of the remedy
with opposing factors to determine the appropriateness of the remedy.
These approaches will be evaluated with reference to Bivens and general
principles of judicial involvement in the fashioning of remedies.
Some courts and commentators have read the majority opinion in
Bivens to hold that once Congress has provided an exclusive remedy for
a constitutional provision, the courts should not substitute an alter-
native unless they deem it to be essential 94 for the vindication of that in-
91. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
93. One may contrast this ambiguity with the clarity of Justice Marshall's
discussion of the meaning of "necessary and proper" in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 413-15 (1819).
94. The Court's decisions in the criminal procedure area indicate that a remedy
is essential where its absence threatens to render illusory the rights guaranteed
by a constitutional provision. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), the
Court determined that application of the exclusionary rule in state criminal trials
was necessary to prevent the fourth amendment from becoming a mere "form of
words." The exclusionary rule was thus linked to the underlying values of privacy
embodied in the fourth, amendment. Recent treatment of the exclusionary rule,
however, has discounted such claims of the rule's importance and cast doubt on its
continued "essentiality" in the constantly shifting landscape of the Constitution. See
Wolff v. Rice, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3046-49 (1976) ; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
The precise nature of the exclusionary rule has never been satisfactorily
established. At times the Court has appeared to view it as merely one remedy
among many, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), while on other occasions
it has been linked directly to the Constitution, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649
(1961). Those who ascribe constitutional status to the exclusionary rule empha-
size its relation to the values of privacy which the fourth amendment embodies
and the need to prevent the government from reaping the benefits arising from the
unconstitutional conduct of one of its officials. See Schrock & Welsh, Up From
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L.
REv. 251, 271-83 (1974). The current movement of the Court seems to be away
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terest.95 This position reflects the view that the Court should not supplant a
congressional determination of remedial policy unless the Court's interpre-
tation of the Constitution requires a different choice. In this sense, a finding
of essentiality would constitute a "true" constitutional decision binding
on the legislature, rather than an instance of constitutional common
law. 96 Thus, assuming the remedy already provided by Congress in sec-
tion 1983 was intended to be exclusive, the stringent essentiality standard
for judicially fashioned remedies is arguably applicable to fourteenth
amendment claims.
The assumption, however, appears to be unwarranted. In matters
of constitutional rights, statutory preclusion of the judiciary from the
remedial sphere requires, at least, a showing that Congress actually in-
tended such exclusion.9 7 This doctrine, labelled the "policy of clear state-
ment," is not satisfied in the case of section 1983: the statutory language
does not disclose any congressional intent to foreclose the judiciary from
acting outside the statutory scheme.98 Thus, a standard that required
a showing of essentiality would seem to be inappropriate. 99 Given the
from this conception of the exclusionary rule as an essential component of the
fourth amendment. Recent cases discuss the rule in terms of its deterrent capabilities,
rather than addressing it as a personal constitutional right. See United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
If it is true that the exclusionary rule is only a judicially fashioned remedy distinct
from any constitutional right, one may question the Court's authority to impose
the rule on the states. Monaghan suggests that this paradox can only be explained
in terms of the Court's general common law approach to protecting individual
constitutional rights. See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 8-10.
95. Clipper v. City of Takoma Park, Civil No. 73-295-B (D. Md., March
25, 1975) at 19, Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 322 (N.D. Ohio 1974) ; Dellinger,
supra note 35, at 1548-49. Because Justice Brennan's reference to situations where
Congress had provided a remedy was phrased as a disclaimer and not as a positive
assertion, however, it is impossible to extract with any certainty such a mechanistic
test from the language of Bivens. 403 U.S. at 397.
96. See the discussion in notes 57 and 60 on the distinction drawn by Professor
Monaghan between "true" constitutional decisions and constitutional common law.
97. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 336. Note, Damage Remedies,
supra note 7, at 943; Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27,
133-36 (1974); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944).
98. See Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 944.
99. If a court should find that section 1983 fulfills the "clear statement" require-
ment, however, it is doubtful that the damage remedy would satisfy a standard of
essentiality. Damages serve a dual remedial function of providing compensation for
injuries inflicted and deterring future wrongful conduct. See Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 94, at 314. Damages relate to the operation of the right in the legal
system, not to the substantive elements of the right. Unlike the features of the
exclusionary rule which bind it to notions of privacy embraced by the fourth
amendment, see id. at 271-88, damages remain distinct from the substantive content
of the constitutional rights. See generally id. at 314-19. For example, while
fourteenth amendment due process requires some kind of hearing in connection with
governmental action that inflicts injury, nothing in the fundamental nature of due
process requires that damages be provided if a hearing is denied. Thus, the crucial
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problems in ascertaining essentiality and the traditional judicial role in
protecting individual constitutional rights, a more flexible approach is de-
sirable in the absence of explicit congressional preclusion.100
The balancing test utilized by Justice Harlan to determine the
"appropriateness" of a remedy provides this flexibility by considering
appropriateness in terms of a whole range of policy considerations. If
a remedy satisfies a standard of essentiality, it must be because it is of
constitutional stature;1°1 if all implied remedies must meet this standard,
it follows that before it is appropriate for the court to imply a remedy,
that remedy must be held to be required by the Constitution. Under a
balancing test, judicial decisions on remedies are less august. It has
been suggested that they contribute to a body of constitutional common
law intended to implement the Constitution, but not required by it.102
Unlike decisions of constitutional stature, this constitutional common law
should be subject to congressional review and modification. The de-
velopment of this common law is characterized by judicial weighing of
relevant policy considerations.
Applying Justice Harlan's formula in the context of the fourteenth
amendment, a court must balance the need to recover damages from
municipalities against any negative ramifications such a remedy would
have beyond the remedial sphere. One argument for creating a damage
remedy is that section 1983 lacks sufficient deterrent force because its
immediate impact is limited to the perpetrator of the unconstitutional
action. Consequently, there is no pressure on the governmental entities
that confer authority on such persons to institute systemic changes de-
signed to eliminate patterns of unconstitutional behavior. 10 3 Allowing
recovery directly from the municipality for the constitutional torts of
its employees would change this situation; the treasury would become
an advocate for reform. There is no concrete evidence, however, that
increased deterrence would actually result from municipal liability. 04
nexus between right and remedy that forms the basis of "Mapp-type linkage" is
missing.
100. See Hill, supra note 43 at 1153; Monaghan, supra note 36, at 18-19.
101. See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 24 & n.125.
102. As Monaghan persuasively demonstrates, the product of the Court is best
described as constitutional common law arising from judicial policy determinations as
to the best way to implement the Constitution. It is the only satisfactory explanation
of the Court's behavior in many cases. See generally Monaghan, supra note 36, at 1-26.
103. See Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1975); K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 864 (1970 Supp.). The assumption is that imposing
liability on the governmental entity will encourage it to devote greater attention to
the training and supervision of its employees. Once the public fisc is brought into
play, the municipality will be less willing to tolerate costly misbehavior, and preven-
tive programs will be the probable response. See also Comment, Equal Protection,
supra note 5, at 1158-60; Kates & Kouba, supra note 5, at 140-41.
104. Cf. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REv. 665, 717 n.145 (1970).
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While in Mapp v. Ohio'0 5 the Court did not require proof of actual
deterrence before applying the exclusionary rule, it has become increasingly
hesitate to exercise such intuitive judicial policy making.'0 6
The limitation of section 1983 actions to "persons" also forms the
basis for an attack on the adequacy of the compensation afforded by
that section to the victims of unconstitutional conduct. The argument
is that the presumed limited financial resources of the average municipal
employee tend to make him judgment proof.10 7 If true, this deficiency
would seriously undermine the efficacy of the statutory scheme.' 08 The
weight to be accorded this problem, however, depends on its scope; section
1983 defendants may as a class be judgment proof, or there may be just
scattered instances when plaintiffs can not satisfy their judgments. While
the assertion of financial inadequancy seems intuitively correct, the lack
of empirical data makes precise evaluation impossible. 10 9
Turning to the other side of the analysis, it is necessary to ascertain
if there are any "special factors counseling hesitation."" 0 One considera-
tion arguing against recognition of a damage remedy against municipalities
is federalism. Most of the courts that have refused to extend Bivens to
cover fourteenth amendment claims identify federalism as a distinguishing
characteristic."' Because Bivens only addressed the liability of federal
officers under the fourth amendment, considerations of federalism were
absent. Where a federal court is asked to award damages against a local
governmental entity, however, considerations of federalism are directly at
issue. The theory is that our system seeks a wide dispersion of power and
that any tendency toward undue concentration of power in the national
government is to be resisted. 112 Because state courts are obligated to hear
105. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Cf. United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
107. See Dellinger, supra note 35, at 1553-54; Comment, Equal Protection, supra
note 5, at 1158-59 (1969). Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) ;
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Nichols, J., concurring), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
108. Even if defendants are not wholly judgment proof, delays in recovery might
detract from the element of promptness that should characterize an adequate remedy.
Cf. Comment, The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission or the Federal Courts?
A Problem of Exhaustion, 35 MD. L. REV. 458, 475 (1976).
109. See Clipper v. City of Takoma Park, Civil No. 73-295-B (D. Md., March
25, 1975), at 24.
110. 403 U.S. at 396 (Harlan, J., concurring).
111. Clipper v. City of Takoma Park, Civil No. 73-295-B (D. Md., March 25,
1975) at 21, 25-26; Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 230 (D. Conn. 1974).
112. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959); B. MARSHALL,
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 50-51 (1964). This restrictive view of federal powers
is not the only possible interpretation of the proper allocation of power between the
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federal claims based on the Constitution, the theory continues, there is
little need for a federal damage remedy.'1 3
Moreover, to the extent that the section 1983 remedy proves unsatis-
factory, a litigant may resort to state remedies against municipalities.
Given the erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, state damage
remedies against municipalities have become commonplace." 4 If pendent
party jurisdiction were available, a federal court might entertain both a
section 1983 claim against a municipal employee and a related state
claim against his municipal employer." 5 In Aldinger v. Howard,"6 how-
ever, the Supreme Court ruled that pendent party jurisdiction was not
available in a section 1983 action to join a municipality sued on a state
claim. Recovery on a state cause of action would therefore entail a sepa-
rate lawsuit. Since maintenance of separate actions would burden a liti-
gant" 7 without significantly advancing the dispersion of power theory of
federalism, the existence of state causes of action against municipalities
should not impede recognition of a federal claim.
state and federal governments. In Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights,
75 YALE L.J. 1007 (1966), the author suggests an alternative theory of federalism,
labeled "federalist," in which he argues that the federal government should intervene
in state affairs when a certain minimum of political freedom and individual liberty
is threatened. See also Monaghan, supra note 36, at 19.
113. See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs of Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920);
Hill, supra note 43, at 1114-16 & n.29.
114. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d
877 (1973); See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 25 (3d ed. 1972).
115. Generally, a claim is said to be within the pendent jurisdiction of the federal
courts when (1) it is joined in the same complaint to another substantial claim that
independently meets the statutory requirements for federal jurisdiction and (2) it
arises from the same "nucleus of operative fact" as that of the federal claim. United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567, at 443-45 (1975).
Adding a state claim against a municipality to a section 1983 claim against
a municipal employee would involve a pendent party as well as a pendent claim. The
issue was before the Court in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), in
the form of a state claim against the county based on the California Tort Claims Act,
but the question was not resolved. Instead, the Court upheld the lower court's exer-
cise of discretion in refusing to accept the pendent claim because of the uncertainty
and complexity of state law on municipal liability. Id. at 715-17. The Supreme
Court returned to the question in Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976),
ruling that Congressional exclusion of municipalities from the liability of section
1983 constituted an implied hostility to bringing municipalities back into federal
court as defendants on state claims. Pendent party jurisdiction was therefore not
available in section 1983 actions brought under the jurisdictional provision of 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3). For an excellent discussion of the law of pendent party jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases as it existed prior to Aldinger, see Note, Federal
Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs - Federal Question
and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 208-17 (1976).
116. 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
117. See Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 2429-30 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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Recognition of federal monetary claims against municipalities may
alter the operation of municipal governments, but, to the extent that
the changes reflect constitutional values, they should not be objectionable.
The municipality has a choice; it can simply pay damages or use its money
to institute systematic changes designed to eliminate constitutional de-
privations. Furthermore, the availability of equitable relief to enforce the
fourteenth amendment contradicts concern over interference with local
government. The complex plans imposed by the judiciary in efforts at
school desegregation'1 8 demonstrate that federalism can tolerate interven-
tion in local affairs far beyond any threat posed by money damages.
The possibility of conflicting congressional determinations as to the
propriety of making municipalities liable for injuries caused by viola-
tions of the fourteenth amendment presents a more substantial obstacle
to the extension of Bivens. While the policy of clear statement" 9 makes
only an explicit determination by Congress dispositive of the question, a
less-than-clear statement would also seem to have some lesser weight in
Justice Harlan's balancing process. In our governmental structure, Con-
gress has primary responsibility for the formulation of general social
policy; it enacts legislation to achieve a broad spectrum of national
objectives, while the Supreme Court is limited to the adjudication of
cases and controversies. 120 Given this allocation of functions, judicial de-
ference to congressional policy determinations is often desirable. 12 1 Congress
118. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ;
Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The Boston school busing case indicates
that a federal court may go to the extreme of placing a school in receivership subject
to judicial control to ensure implementation of a desegregation order. McDonough v.
Morgan, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2648 (1976).
119. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
120. See Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
CIN. L. R:v. 209-11, 220-23, 254-55 (1971).
121. For example, in Brown v. General Services Administration, 96 S. Ct. 1961
(1976), the Court held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empted more
general judicial remedies. Id. at 1968-69. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
441-42 (1944), which recognized the power of Congress in implementing the Emer-
gency Price Control Act to proscribe the issuance of interlocutory injunctions.
What the courts could do Congress can do as the guardian of the public interest
of the nation in time of war. The legislative formulation of what would otherwise
be a rule of judicial discretion is not a denial of due process or a usurpation of
judicial functions.
Id. at 441-42. Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). In Alyeska, the Court ruled that federal courts could not use their equitable
power to award attorney's fees on a private attorney general theory without express
congressional authorization. Id. at 254-69. While attorneys' fees are not truly
remedies, they may play an important role in encouraging private parties to vindicate
statutory and constitutional interests. See Note, A Giant Step Backwards: Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society and its Effect on Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 35 MD. L. REv. 675, 692-96 (1976). Although the Court's use of existing statutes
on fees to justify its decision is open to criticism, its concerns about the propriety of
imposing a judicial solution to a problem beset with complex policy considerations
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is better equipped to make determinations on complex matters of "legis-
lative fact" and has a wider range of remedies available to it. 1 22 The
representative character of Congress also makes it a more appropriate
forum for reconciling competing interests. 23 Where judicial action is
directed toward the fashioning of constitutional common law rather than
"true" constitutional decisions, deference to the superior policy-making
abilities of Congress is particularly appropriate. Before imposing such
constraints on judicial action, however, it is necessary to determine
whether contrary congressional determinations counseling judicial restraint
actually exist.
In the fourteenth amendment context, this entails an examination
of section 1983. Enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment,124 section 1983 provides a right to relief against all persons acting
under color of state law who deprive others of constitutional or federal
rights. Since section five vests Congress with the authority to pass legis-
lation to enforce the fourteenth amendment, it is arguable that this ar-
rangement favors judicial deference to congressional determinations about
the proper remedial approach for realizing the interests of the amend-
ment. 25 The precise scope of section five has not been clearly delineated,
but existing judicial pronouncements indicate that the grant of power
is extensive. 2  Discussing section five in Ex parte Virginia127 the court
noted:
All of the amendments derive much of their force from this latter
provision. It is not said the judicial power of the general govern-
ment shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the
rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the
government shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State
in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which
has been enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions
by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make
the amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate,
that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in
view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality
of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State
seems justifiable. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 177-80
(1975). See generally Cox, supra note 120.
For a discussion of the judiciary's fundamental weakness as a policy making
institution and the relevance of that weakness to the constitutional structure of govern-
ment, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175--81 (1970).
122. See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 28-29; Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Mor-
gantic Marriage, 1969 S. CT. REv. 81, 112-14.
123. See Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 949.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
125. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 261 & n.51 (1973).
126. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
127. 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880).
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denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain
of congressional power.
Given this explicit textual designation of congressional responsibility for
the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, it would seem that con-
gressional rejection of a proposed remedy deserves additional weight in
the balancing process.
These concerns are significant because in Monroe v. Pape,128 a
damage action against the city of Chicago and some of its police officers
for violations of fourth amendment interests incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment, the Court ruled that the term "person" in section
1983 did not include municipalities. 129 This conclusion stemmed from
a reading of the legislative history that disclosed extreme congressional
hostility to the notion of municipal liability. Toward the close of debates
on the 1871 civil rights legislation, Senator Sherman introduced an amend-
ment making municipalities strictly liable in damages for injuries suffered
by reason of unconstitutional conduct within their boundaries. 130 The
128. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
129. Id. at 187-92.
130. As originally passed by the Senate, the amendment read:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall be
unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly
or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if
any person shall unlawfully and with force and violence be whipped, scourged,
wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together;
and if such offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred
upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or
punish him for exercising any such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, in every such case the inhabitants of the county,
city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable
to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense if
living, or to his legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be re-
covered by such person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United
States of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense was com-
mitted, to be in the name of the person injured, or his legal representative, and
against said county, city, or parish; and execution may be issued on a judgment
rendered in such suit, and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of
any person in said county, city, or parish; and the said county, city, or parish
may recover the full amount of said judgment, cost, and interest from any person
or persons engaged as principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704 (1871) (emphasis added). An amended
version read:
[A]ny payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recorded by the
plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual defendant therein
within two months next after the recovery of such judgment upon execution duly
issued against such individual defendant in such judgment, and returned unsatis-
fied, in whole or in part, be enforced against such county, city, or parish, by
execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding in aid
of execution or applicable to the enforcement of judgments against municipal
corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the
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House twice defeated this proposal by resounding margins. From this
vote and the accompanying debate, the Monroe court reasoned that Con-
gress could not have meant to include municipalities in the class of "per-
sons" covered by section 1983.131
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view of the legislative history in
Moor v. County of Alameda.132 Moor involved a damage action against
a municipality for the unconstitutional conduct of its police. The plaintiffs
argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1988133 allowed a federal court to entertain a
claim based on state law providing for municipal liability because the
exclusion of municipalities from section 1983 made that remedy inade-
quate. The Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, ruled that section
1988 could not be used to accomplish what Congress refused to do in
section 1983.134 Although the opinion may be read narrowly to address only
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof. And
the court in any such action may on motion cause additional parties to be made
therein prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done. And the said
county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, by it paid,
with costs and interest from any person or persons engaged as principal or
accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And
such county, city, or parish, so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plain-
tiff's rights under such judgment.
Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
131. The House's reaction to Senator Sherman's amendment focused on the
deleterious impact on local treasuries of such liability and on the feeling that Congress
should not interfere with local government to such a great extent. See the remarks
of Representative Poland, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 800-01 (1871) [here-
inafter cited as 42 CONG. GLOBE]; Id. at 795 (remarks of Representative Blair).
The Court concluded:
The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable
for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April
20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word "person"
was used in this particular Act to include them.
365 U.S. at 191. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the entire
Civil Rights Act of 1871, see Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected
Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 331 (1967).
132. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973). The dispute in Bruno arose from the city's denial of liquor license renewals
to tavern owners who had permitted nude dancing in their taverns. The owners
sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983, claiming that the city's
failure to provide adversary hearings prior to the decision not to renew denied them
due process. The Court ruled that the meaning of "persons" in section 1983 could
not depend on the type of relief sought.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, permits
federal courts to employ state remedies where the federal ones prove inadequate.
134. 411 U.S. at 710. Similarly, in Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976),
the Court ruled that the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against municipalities
under section 1983 precluded the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction to reach munici-
palties sued on state claims. Id. at 2421. See note 141 infra.
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the scope of section 1988,135 the Court relied extensively on the legislative
history used by the Monroe Court to explain the scope of section 1983. As
Justice Marshall observed :136
[T]he very issue here is ultimately what Congress intended federal
law to be, and, as petitioners themselves recognized, Congress did
not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose vicarious liability on
municipalities for violations of federal civil rights by their employees.
Those who advocate recognition of municipal liability discount legis-
lative history as an interpretive tool, dismissing the device as arbitrary
and unreliable.137  Beyond this general attack, they criticize Monroe's
treatment of section 1983's legislative history; their view of the legislative
history stresses three aspects of the circumstances prevailing in 1871
that undercut the contemporary validity of the Court's version. First,
they observe that sovereign immunity occupied such an established place
in the American legal system in 1871 that Congress mistakenly doubted
its power to abrogate the doctrine. 138 Second, they contend that because
municipalities had not yet begun to assume localized police functions in
1871, Congress felt it would be unreasonable to impose liability upon
them for failure to perform law enforcement duties that were not theirs
to perform. 3 9 Third, it is pointed out that the Sherman amendment
sought to impose blanket liability for all acts committed within a juris-
diction, especially acts by non-official groups like the Ku Klux Klan;
it did not address the respondeat superior variety of liability presented by
the current group of cases. 140
135. 'Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 941.
136. 411 U.S. at 710 n.27.
137. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 7, at 135; Note, Developing Governmental
Liability, supra note 7, at 1206.
138. See, Comment, State Equal Protection Liability, supra note 5, at 1166-67;
Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 947-48. The argument is that Congressional
reluctance to impose liability reflected a desire to avoid interference with the
established state law concept of sovereign immunity. To the extent that this doctrine
has been eliminated, however, this reason no longer applies and so the supposed
hostility to municipal liability should be discounted.
139. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 5, at 134-35; Note, Damage Remedies, supra
note 7, at 948. According to this view, the opponents of liability felt that such
a measure would force the states to adopt a more structured approach to local
law enforcement. They denounced such a result as inconsistent with traditional
principles of federalism. Since municipal police departments are now the norm in
the United States, it is suggested that such concerns about the possibility of massive
structural changes are no longer relevant. Kates & Kouba, supra note 5, at 140-41.
Still, because proponents of a damage action based directly on the fourteenth amend-
ment expect that it will change the operating procedures of local governmental
units, the contrary view that favors local autonomy remains important.
140. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 5 at 136; Note, Developing Governmental
Liability, supra note 5, at 1205-06; Comment, Suing Public Entities, supra note 5,
at 118-19; Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 948. This view seeks to limit
the congressional hostility perceived by the Court in Monroe to just that type of
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These dissenting views must overcome Supreme Court pronounce-
ments that are clearly to the contrary. Although it is true that legisla-
tive history is a malleable device, when the Court repeatedly utilizes such
history to explain a statute, the device becomes more rigid.1 41 Consistency
in statutory interpretation is desirable unless the Court's view is shown
to be factually erroneous. The decision in Monroe was the product of
an extensive study of the legislative history. The Court was aware of the
policy considerations favoring municipal liability and the possibility of
congressional misapprehensions about its power to impose liability, yet it
found congressional antagonism to be so unmistakable that other inter-
pretations were impossible. Moreover, the congressional debates ranged
beyond the question of power and denunciations of strict liability. They
expressed concern for the financial strain on municipal treasuries 142 and
the inadvisability of interference with the operation of local govern-
ments. 143  Recent scholarship suggests that exclusion of municipalities
represented a deliberate choice by Congress to limit the remedies of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 to individuals rather than governmental en-
tities.' 44 Since there is ample support in the legislative record for the
Court's view, it should prevail.
blanket liability contained in the Sherman amendment. Having established that
proposition, it can be argued that vicarious liability should be treated like the
question of equitable relief; since Congress is silent, there are no barriers to judicial
action.
141. The recent decision in Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976), is illus-
trative of the Court's disinclination to freshly scrutinize legislative history that it
has reviewed on a previous occasion. In Aldinger, the Court ruled that the grant
of jurisdiction in section 1343 did not authorize the exercise of pendent party juris-
diction in a section 1983 action to include a municipality sued under state law.
See notes 116-17 and accompanying text supra. The Court explained this out-
come by reference to the established legislative history of congressional hostility
to municipal liability. 96 S. Ct. at 2421. It reasoned that the congressional hostility
that caused the exclusion of municipalities from the coverage of section 1983 also
constituted an implicit refusal to expand federal jurisdiction to reach municipal
defendants. Id. Although Justice Brennan's dissent contended that the legislative
debates disclosed no hostility to the notion of providing a federal forum for state
claims, the majority felt that the factor of hostility to municipal liability was dis-
positive. Id. at 2422-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Like the decision in Moor,
which refused to permit the use of the section 1988 portion of the 1871 Civil Rights
Act to circumvent section 1983, the Court simply rejected the notion that the juris-
dictional provision of the 1871 act could support damage actions against munici-
palities in defiance of section 1983's legislative history. Id. at 2421 & n.12. Because
Justice Brennan's legislative history did not question the fundamental premise of
congressional hostility to municipal liability, it did not undercut the Court's reasoning.
Thus, the Monroe legislative history was reaffirmed without new debate.
142. See 42 CONG. GLOBE at 788-89 (remarks of Representative Kerr); Id. at
772 (remarks of Representative Thurman).
143. Id. at 763 (remarks of Representative Casserly).
144. See, Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 75 COLUm. L. REV. 1413 (1975). The author traces the legislative history of
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Another argument against viewing section 1983 as a bar to recog-
nizing damages against municipalities directly on the fourteenth amend-
ment is the practice of providing equitable relief under that amendment.
145
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno146 the Supreme Court ruled that municipali-
ties were not persons under section 1983 for purposes of equitable relief
as well as for damages. At the same time, it clearly left open the possi-
bility of obtaining equitable relief under the general federal question
jurisdiction.147 Subsequent courts have reasoned that if equitable relief
against municipalities survives exclusion from section 1983, the same must
be true of damages.148 That view ignores the substance of the decision in
Bruno, which rested on the absence of congressional intent to make the
meaning of "person" depend on the type of relief sought.' 49 This ground
for decision is much different from that of Monroe, which excluded munici-
palities from liability under section 1983 because of the evidence of
congressional hostility to damages. No similar hostility exists with respect
to equitable relief against municipalities. Senator Sherman's amendment
was only concerned with damages and the legislative debates were
similarly confined to that form of liability. It has even been argued that
this silence reflected a presumption that equitable relief would be available
to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 15° Thus, because Bruno was de-
cided on the narrow ground that the meaning of "person" should be
consistent, it does little to override the clearly expressed congressional
hostility to municipal liability in damages.
Finally, some observers argue that the legislative history of section
1983 is irrelevant to considerations of judicial implication of a remedy
because contemporary conditions and congressional attitudes are vastly
different from those that prevailed in 1871.151 They also contend that
both the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in order to dis-
cover congressional attitudes toward enforcement of the amendment. He finds a
strong presumption in favor of the use of the equitable powers of the federal courts
to achieve realization of the rights conferred. Id. at 1455-58. With respect to
damages, however, the prevailing view was that liability should end with the
individual responsible for the unconstitutional intrusion. There was no inclination
to impose direct financial burdens on the operation of governmental units, either
state or local, at that time. Id. at 1459-60, 1467-68. See 42 CONG. GLOBE at 459
(remarks of Representative Coburn).
145. See cases cited in note 82 supra.
146. 412 U.S. 507 (1973), discussed in note 132 supra.
147. Two Justices went even further, stating that a right to recover would
clearly exist under the rationale of Bivens. 412 U.S. at 516 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
concurring).
148. Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514
F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) ; Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill.,
E.D. 1975).
149. 412 U.S. at 513-14.
150. Id. at 517-520 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Comment, Injunctive Relief
Against Municipalities Under Section 1983, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 389 (1970) ; Nowak,
supra note 144, at 1455-58.
151. See Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 949.
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judicial deference based on the Monroe Court's view of the legislative his-
tory conflicts with the development of common law under the fourteenth
amendment' 52 and that Congress has itself imposed liability on municipali-
ties in some situations.'5" These arguments are not compelling. Con-
gressional pronouncements do not lose force simply because of the passage
of time. 5 4  Moreover, that Congress has imposed some liabilities on
municipalities may disclose its preference for a piecemeal approach rather
than a program of broad liability. Similarly, constitutional common law
should not develop independent of congressional attitudes, but in concert
with them. Where Congress has made its preferences known, respect
for its enhanced policy-making abilities counsels deference. 55
CONCLUSION
The question of extending Bivens to fourteenth amendment claims
raises important questions about the respective roles of the Court and
Congress in implementing the Constitution. Bivens recognized a new
dimension in the meaning of article III judicial power, but it also sug-
gested that the exercise of this power might be constrained by contrary
congressional action. The possibility of adverse congressional action
assumes added significance once it is perceived that a Bivens-type remedy
is a product of constitutional common law, not "true" constitutional deci-
sion making.
Contrary congressional action exists in the fourteenth amendment
context in the form of the legislative history of section 1983. Admittedly,
the notion of congressional hostility to municipal liability rests on a nega-
tive inference drawn from the legislative history rather than on an explicit
declaration in the text of the statute, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly
given this interpretation its imprimatur of legitimacy. Given the allocation
of responsibility for policy determinations between the legislative and
judicial branches and the fourteenth amendment's express provision for
congressional enforcement, the limitations on the section 1983 damage
remedy deserve significant weight in assessing the propriety of granting a
conflicting remedy. Balanced against the limited and speculative nature of
municipal contributions to compensation, these fundamental notions of
proper judicial function dictate refusal by the courts to fashion a damage
remedy against municipalities directly under the fourteenth amendment. 156
152. See id. at 949-51.
153. See id. at 949 n.143, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b), & (h) (Supp.
IV, 1974) (municipal liability for employment discrimination). Note, Municipal
Liability, supra note 7, at 572-73.
154. Cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
155. See Monaghan, supra note 36, at 26-30 & n.155.
156. In the event that the federal courts decided to accept the extension of
Bivens to the fourteenth amendment, difficult problems would remain with respect to
defining the scope of the cause of action and the availability of municipal immunity.
See generally Note, Damage Remedies, supra note 7, at 952-58.
[VOL, 36
